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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OSCAR PETERSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
-vs.-
CLAUDE ALKEMA and MRS. CLAUDE 
ALKEMA, his wife, 
Defendants and Resp-ondents. 
SAMUEL C. POWELL 
DERRAH B. VAN DYKE 
Attorneys for Defendoots and 
Respondents 
STATEME.NT OF FACTS 
The appellant's statement of facts is substantially 
correct. However, there are omissions of some material 
facts to which we direct the ·Court's attention. 
The appellant testified in his deposition that he had 
used ladders for the picking of fruit for five or six years 
and was familiar with different types of ladders used in 
connection with the picking of fruit (PD 8-9). 
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"Q. And how rnany years have you been picking 
apricots, fruit~ 
A. Well, I'll say off and on for- rive or six ·years; 
sornetiines I'll n1iss· a year, and put in a 
rnonth or two wheri 'there wasn't nothing else 
to do. 
Q. What kind of ladders have you been using, 
regular picking ladders~ 
A. Regular picking ladders. T'here's two kind~ 
of picking ladders. One comes up to a point, 
and the other one is a square one on top. 
That is about the only two- picking ladders I 
know about. 
Q. This one con1es up to a point~ 
A. Yes. Comes up to a point, like that (illus-
trating). 
Q. Three legged~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is the ordinary ladder used for picking, 
is it~ 
A. Yes." (PD 8-9). 
On the day in question, the appellant started pick-
ing fruit about. 8 :00 A.M. using this ladder continuously 
except for a limch period·· (PD· 12). That during such 
ti;r:ne: he picked thirty-two (32) bushels- of apricots. (AD 
9'-10). The ladder used· by the appellant was· in good conf 
dition. The appellant. testified that the. ladder was: not 
"rickety" · ( PD 9), and the ladder had been used by re-
spondent Claude Alkema. the day before (AD 6), whose 
weight was 240 p.ounds (AD 6). · 
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4-\fter the appellant quit \rork, rt\spondent l~laude 
.A.lke1na exa1uined the ladder and saw that it 'vas broken 
in three plaee~, on one of the ~ide rails. The ste vs were 
not broken ( ... -\D 1:2). ~rhe ladder "·a~ an ordinary ladder 
u~ed in the picking of fruit) being \rhat is designated as 
an eight foot ladder ha \·iug threL1 leg·~ 'rith seven steps in 
it, coming to a point at the top. It was of wood con-
~truction. lT nder each step there was a steel rod attached 
to the side rails to brace the ladder and its steps (AD 
ti-7) (PD 1:2). 
Appellant had been using the ladder in the picking 
of fruit for about six and one-half (60) hours, except for 
the time he "\Yas eating lunch ( PD 9) (AD 10). 
Prior to appellant's injury, respondent Claude Al-
kema had told him to quit work (AD 10), and when he 
didn't quit, Alkema went down and on his way met the 
appellant (AD 11). Appellant told Alkema he had in-
jured his hand (PD 13). Appellant, after asking Alkema 
for cold water, in response to a question from Mr. Alkema 
as to whether his arm hurt very bad said, "Oh I think 
it is just more of a bruise. It will be all right in a day 
or two." (AD 11). Appellant poured water upon his 
arm himself (PD l±). He did not ask Alkema for medical 
aid. A short time after the accident Alkema brought 
appellant to Ogden in his automobile and let him out at 
24th ~treet and Lincoln Avenue, because the appellant 
said he wanted to get out there (AD 14), which place is 
a block away from the lVlilner Hotel where appellant was 
staying (PD 14). When appellant left Alkema's auto-
3 
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tlnobile, he: did notas;k1for medical aid (AD 14). ·.When he 
.w-Qnt ~to th'e JMilner .HoteLhe:did,not.ask:the. clerk;to<ob-
.tain a doctor .for.hiin (BD 14). He went out that~ evening 
to -supper :somewhere on 25th ·Street near the .Milner 
)Hotel. He purchased :four bottles of beer. and took ~the 
li>eer to:his' roo1n and· dTank the, beer during 'the. night (BD 
-lG-lG). The following.Inorning1he ·went to·a coffee:shop 
and· ordered ;a 1 cup o·f coff-ee and then saw a polieeman 
who took hiln.totthe Dee~Hospital (PD 16). After he:had 
been to the hospital and the doctor, he commencetl-to piek 
apricots ~gain and worked for two or three d~ys (PD 
17.). He went back tos_ee.the doctor once.(PD 1~). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The points .upon which respondents rely to sustain 
the judgment(nf the District Court.are;as·iollo-~.: 
Point ·1-The _pleadings and depositions .show that 
there 'is -no genuine ·issue as to any material 'fact and 
the .:facts dis-closed ·by the pleadings and depositions 
bring ·the 'Case squarely- within ·the ''simple tool'' ·rule, 
th-erefore, respondents· are -entitletl to a summary -,jutlg-
ment~as:a 'matter of ;law ron -theJfirst\cause --of a~tion. 
·point 2--The pleadings and depositions show that 
there 'is no genuine "issue a.s to any material fact ana 
under the facts ·disclosed by the pleadings ana a~po­
sitions no aetionable negligence on ·the part 'df re· 
spondents ca.n be found and, ·thererore, respondents 
are entitled 1to ·a -summary judgment ·as ·a ·matter ·of law 
on . the seconu cause ·of· action. 
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.A.RGUMENT 
ln the Di8triet Court hearing it \vas stipulated by 
the parties in open Court that the deposition of the appel-
lant and the deposition of the respondent Claude Alken1a 
be published, read and considered by the Court. Argu-
Inents by counsel for appellant and respondents on the 
law w·ere fully heard and considered by the Court. No 
genuine issue as to any Inaterial fact is disclosed by the 
pleadings and depositions and the District Court ren-
dered sUlillnary judgment as a Inatter of law in favor 
of respondents on both causes of action. This it could 
do without findings under Rule 56 (c), and Rule 52 (a). 
Rule 52 (a) provides : 
". . . Findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are unnecessary on decisions of motions under 
rule 12 or 56 or any other motion except as pro-
vided in Rule 41 (b)." 
Rule 41 (b) has no application in this case. 
POINT 1 
THE PLEADINGS AND DEPOSITIONS SHOW THAT 
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL 
FACT AND THE FACTS DISCLOSED BY THE PLEADINGS 
AND DEPOSITIONS BRING THE CASE SQUARELY WITH-
IN THE "SIMPLE TOOL" RULE, THEREFORE, RESPOND-
ENTS ARE ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The appellant at the time of this accident was a ma-
ture man, being fifty-eight (58) years of age, and was of 
sufficient intelligence and rnenta.l capacity to appreciate 
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danger. lie was familiar with the use of fruit picking 
ladders, having used thein for 1nore than fiiVe ( 5) years. 
The type of fruit picking ladder which he was using is 
generally and connnonly used in fruit picking. It is siul-
ple in construetion so the defects, if any, therein could 
be discovered without skill or knowledge and without 
intricate inspection. The appellant chose the ladder at 
the beginning of his work, set it up, tried it, and found 
that it was not "rickety." He used this ladder in picking 
apricots continuously for a period of six and one-half 
hours, with the exception of a short lunch period, rnoving 
it from tree to tree. He, of necessity, went up and down 
it during his picking and prior to the accident he ·had 
picked thirty-two (32) bushels of apricots. If there were 
any defects in the ladder they n1ost certainly could have 
been discovered by the appellant in his examination and 
use of this ladder. The appellant was as well qualified 
as the re~pondents to detect any defects, if any, in the 
ladder and to judge of the probable danger of using 
it. The respondent Claude Alkerna had used this ladder 
hirnself the day before, he being a,rnuch larger man than 
the appellant. 
Under these facts and circumstances, it is c_lear t~t 
this case comes squarely within the rule of law known 
as the "Sirnple Tool" rule. The rule was recognized and 
appl_ied by this court in the case of Proctor v. Town Cl~b, 
Inc., l05 Utah 72, 141 Pac. 2nd 156. In that case the ·eln-
ployer furnished the plaintiff with a stepladder for the 
purpose of hanging drapes. This stepladder suddenly 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
split and collapsed, causing the injuries co1nplained of. 
This Court held that the stepladder "'"as in tJ1e class of 
ordinary shnple tools, applied the siiuple tool rule and 
held against the plaintiff. 
The Court through Justice McDonnough quoted the 
rule as laid down in the case of Ne,vbern v. Great At-
lantic & Pacific Tea Co., 4 Cir., 68 F. 2d 523, 91 ALR 
784, as set forth in appellant's brief at page 19 thereof. 
Appellant in his brief at page 22 thereof seeks to 
rely upon a comment made by Justice McDonnough in 
the Proctor case to the effect that it may be assumed 
without deciding that even as to a simple tool a master 
who furnishes to .his workmen regularly employed, such 
tool as an incident of his ·regular business, has the duty 
of prudently inspecting it or be liable for injuries result-
ing from defects which inspection .would have revealed. 
This comment can have no application to the case at bar, 
because the appellant does· not allege or claim that in-
spection would have revealed the defect, nor was the 
appellant a workman regularly employed, being a trans-
ient fruit picker engaged only during the portion of one 
day. 
We call the ·court's attention to paragraph 111, sub-
division c of appellant's first cause of action of his com-
plaint as shown on page· 3 of his brief. In that paragraph 
of his complaint appellant himself alleges that the· break-
ing of the ladder was "sudden, unusual and unexpected.'' 
In addition we agam call attention to the fact that re-
spondent, Claude Alkema had himself . used the ladder 
'l 
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the day before and the appellant had the ladder in his 
posse'Ssion and custody and had been using it for some 
six. and one-half. hours .. 
In Proctor v. Town Club, sup-ra, this Court cited 
with approval the Michigan case of Nichols v~ Bush 291 
Mich. 473, 289 N.W. 219; and the Michigan case· of Kelley 
v. Brown 262 Mich. 356, 247 NW 900. These Michigan 
cases are cited and the simple tool doctrine followed 
in the recent Michigan case of Rule v. Giuglio 7 N.W. 2nd 
227;·145 A.L.R. 5.37 .. In tha~ case the plaintiff was em-
ployed by defendent to p·aint window frames, sash and 
eaves of defendant's house. Part of the work was paint~ 
ing around the attic windows above the sun porch .. De~ 
fendant furnished the plaintiff with an extension ladder 
consisting of two separate sections, each.between 12 and 
16 feet in length. riaintiff had used the ladder in doing 
part. of the painting of defendant's house. He was using 
one section in painting around the attic windows when 
it broke on one side at the rung. Defendant, who weighed~ 
245 pounds, testified that he, a .few days prior to the acci-
d~nt, h~d used the ladder in washing the windows.of his 
house. The Court held in favor of· the defendant, hold-
ing that the ladder was a simple tool and that the .. case 
came within the. simple tool rule. The Court, at page 229 
of 'the Northwestern Reporter, adopts ·the following state-· 
ment of the simple tool doctrine: 
"Where the tool is simple in construction, so 
-that defects therein can be discovered without 
special skill or knowledge and without intricate in-
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spection, the servant is as well qualified as any-
one else to detect defects and to judge of the prob-
able danger of using such tool while defective; 
and, the tool being in the possession of the ser-
vant, his opportunity for inspection is better than 
that of the master." 
This case we submit is clearly in point with .the case at 
bar. 
In the case of Olsen v. Ken1 Temple, Ancie11t Arabic 
Order of the_Mystic Shrine (North Dakota), 43 NW (2) 
385, the plaintiff was decorating the interior of a p·avilion 
preparatory to a social function given by defendant. 
There was a wire running lengthwise through tlie cente-r 
of the, building fro~ 15 to 16 feet above the floor. The 
defendant's ladder was used.by the plaintiff. T-he plain-
tiff set the· ladde1· under the wire and while attaching 
p~per streamers· to the wire he fell fr()m the_ ladder and 
was injured. He had moved the ladder in p·ntting up the 
streamers during· the period .of an hour prior to the acci-
dent. The step tipped and he fell. Plaintiff had never· 
used the ladder prior to the morning of his injury. In 
th~ maj·ority opinion at page 387 the court say-s : 
"It is the general rule that an employer is 
bound· to use. ordinary care: to furnish his em-
. ployees with reasonably safe and proper tool~ 
and appliances with which to work. (Citing cases 
and. texts.) · 
"This rule of general liability is subject to 
a widely recognized exception. Where the tool or 
appliance is simple in construction and a defect 
therein is discernible without special skill or 
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knowledge, and the employee is as well qualified 
as the employer to detect the defect and appraise 
the danger resulting therefrom, the employee may 
not recover damages from his employer for an in-
.. j~ry due to such a defect that is unknown to the 
employer ... 
· '-'The great weight of authority is to the effect 
that an ordinary portable stepladder is a simple 
tool or .appliance within the rneaning of the simple 
tool doctrine. (Citing cases among which is the 
Kelley and Nichols cases in Michigan, supra.) 
"In Etel v. Grubb, 157 Wash. 311, 288 Pac. 
931, the Supreme Court of W ~shington refused to 
apply the·simple tool doctrine in a stepladder case. 
In Puza Hennecke Co. 158 Wise. 482, 149 NW 223; 
the Court held that a stepladder was a place to 
work and declined to apply the simple tool doc-
trine. We agree with the.majority of Courts that 
an ordinary portable stepladder i_s a simple tool 
ot appliance and that the employee, who uses it, 
is . usually as well qualified to detect any defect 
therein as is the employer who furnishes it. 
"The ladder in question may have been some-
what longer than the average stepladder, but it 
was otherwise of usual construction and there is 
no intimation that the height of the ladder in any 
way contributed to the accident. The plaintiff 
was several steps from the top when he fell. He 
set up the ladder in the first inst:;tnce and as-
cended and descended some eight times over a 
period . of about an hour prior to the accident." 
This case is also squarely 'in point. We again call 
the court's attention to the fact that the plaintiff was 
10 
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"·ell acquainted ",.ith fruit picking ladders and had been 
using the ladder for sou1e six and one-half hours prior 
to the accident. 
The appellant at page 20 of his brief, cites the Ol~en 
case supra, but relies entirely upon the dissenting opin-
ion in the ca~e, \Yhich, of course, \ras not the decision of 
the Court. 
The case of Rule v. Giuglio, supra, is reported in the 
.A.meriean La\v Reports .A .. nnotated and following the 
report at 145 A.L.R. 5-!2, there is an extensive annota-
tion on the subject entitled '~Ladder as ~simple tool with-
in simp(l.e tool doctrine." 
At page 543 the Annotator states: 
·~under ordinary circurnstances a connnon 
wooden ladder is a sirnple tool or appliance within 
th-e meaning of the simple tool doctrine.". 
Cases are then cited fro1n 15 jurisdictions and some 
of them ·discussed. At page 549 ··of the annotation, the 
Annotator says : 
'•It has been held that a stepladder is a sin1ple 
tool or appliance within the simple tool doctrine." 
He cites cases from a number of jurisdictions and dis-
cusses some of them. 
The appellant relies upon the Washington case ~f 
Etel v. Grubb, supra, but this case is contra~·y to the 
weight of authority in the United States as shown by 
the Olsen case, supra, and by the A.L.R. annotation, 
ll 
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supra, and, of course, is also contrary to our Utah law 
as laid down in the Proctor v. Town Club case, supra, 
which recognizes and applies the simple tool rule. 
The appellant at page 24 of his brief cites the -utah 
case of Reynolds v. American F·oundry & Machine Conl-
pany ______ Utah ------, 239 Pac. 2nd 209. That case is not a 
simple tool case. It involves an injury to the employee 
of an independent contractor, who was injured when a de-
fective link separated in a chain. The chain was being 
used to hoist a six ton core of a transformer and the 
chain had not been subjected to weight proof test. The 
simple tool doctrine is not discussed at all and it is ob-
vious that the case is not in point with the case at bar. 
At page 23 of his brief the appellant quotes fron1 
the California case of Moran v. Zenith Oil Company 
206 Pac. 2nd 679~ That is not a simple tool case and hence 
not in point. 
In any event it could have no application to this 
case because it speaks of a liability 
"If it is shown that the employer, licensor, 
or proprietor knew, or by the exercise of reason-
able care should have known of the defect and 
has failed to effect a repair thereof or to warn 
the workman." 
Respondent, Claude 'Alkema, used the ladder the day 
before, no defect, of course, was known to him, nor could 
he have discovered any by the exercise of any reasonable 
care, and the appellant had been using the ladder for 
12 
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1uany ihOUitS \vhile .picking thirty-two {32) bush:els 'of 
aprieots. 
-POINT·-2 
THE ·PLEADINGS AND DEPOSITIONS 'SHOW 'THA'r 
TH"ElRE "'IS .-No .GENUINE .ISSUE AS .TO AN.Y :MATERI-:AL 
FACT AND UNDER THE FACTS DISCLOSED 1BY THE 
PLEADINGS AND DEPOSITIONS NO ACTIONABLE NEGLI-
GENCE ON THE PART OF RESPONDENTS CAN BE FOUND 
AND, THEREFORE, RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO A 
.SUMMARY JUDGMENT 'AS .A :MATTER·.OF.LAW~ON THE 
,SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION . 
. The app_ellant. has. stated the~:general rule that there 
i~ no du~y -q.pon the e~ployer to render_ medicaleare and 
assistance to the employee. It .is stated on_page. 26 of his 
brief- in the case of Szabo v. ·Pennsylvania- R. Co. {N.")J., 
40 Atl. (2) 562, 563, and·the opinion then states an excep-
4tion :to ·the rule. This exception ·orily applies ',when ~he 
:injured employee is ·rendered helpless--so that. he eannut 
p1·ovide for ;his, own care. This l:eXC€ption Lto Lthe ._rule ::ffi 
_stated .on p~e 27 of ~appellantJs -brief. The Jacts _._in this 
ea~e do not eo me ~within the,_ exception. This is. substan-
tiated by .tlte testimony of the appellant himself in his 
deposition. Appellant testified that he had told the re-
spondent, Claude :....t\.lkema, 'he 'had injured his arm and 
asked hin1 -for sorne water or soinething -cold. 'Th-at the 
-appellant hi1n-self got-some. coJd.water/and·poured~it upun 
·his at·m ,an·d :that _.Alkema 2also ~did ·the ··same, rtliing 'for 
hin1 . (PD il4). The . appellant also . testified· .that after. 
going to-the Milner Hotel he_had gone.to the<drl!g.stor~ 
around the _corner and .that he had purchased some lini-
ment and had also put cold water upon the injured part 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that night (PD 14). He made no effort to get in touch 
with the doctor himself or to have a doctor call at the 
hotel, or to ask the clerk of the hotel to obtain a doctor 
for him (PD 14). He stated that he had purchased four 
bottles of beer to take to his roorn, in case that there was 
too much pain, which he drank during the night (PD 15-
16). 
It must be remembered that the injury did not ren-
der the appellant helpless. Alkerna testified he rendered 
first aid treatrnent to hirn. It was only a short tin1e after 
the accident that Alkema took him in his automobile to 
Ogden. He brought him to Ogden to a point at the cor-
ner of 24th Street and Lincoln Avenue a block away 
from appellant's hotel (AD· 14). Appellant made no 
effort to get medical assistance for himself, nor did he 
request Alkema to obtain it for him (AD 14). He quit 
work at approximately 2 :30 in the afternoon and upon 
his return to Ogden could have gone to a doctor's office 
that afternoon within a short time after the injury, which 
he failed to do. It cannot be contended, therefore, that 
the facts in this case come within the exception to the 
rule, as the appellant was not rendered helpless nor was 
there at anytime strict necessity nor urgent exigency. To 
what extent this exception to the general rule has become 
established in law is doubtful. We quote from 35 Arneri-
can Jurisprudence, paragraph 109, pages 537-8: 
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··LI .. \BILI'l"Y FOR lNJ.URY 'fO EMPLOY-
E:bj FOR WANT OF CARE. Inas1nuch as the 
relationship of. en1ployer and e1nployee does not 
in1pose upon the fornter a legal obligation to care 
for the ailing or injured eu1ployee, the e1nployer, 
in the absence of special agree1nent or statutory 
requireinent, 111ay not be held liable for injury 
\vhich has been suffered by the e1nployee because 
of a vvant of 1nedical or surgical treatment; this 
is true although the necessity for professional 
attendance or treatn1ent has arisen by reason of 
conduct \vhirh renders the en1ployer liable to the 
e1nployee. Accordingly, it has been held that a 
railroad con1pany n1ay not be held liable for hav-
ing failed to carry to his home an employee whose 
feet have been, frozen by exposure while in the 
course of his eu1ployn1ent. However, in some 
states there seen1s to have existed for some tin1e 
a general opinion that railroads should furnish 
aid to injured en1ployees, and the trend of author-
ity seems to impose upon the employer a general 
duty to care for an en1ployee who has, while en-
gaged in perfornling the services of his employ-
nlent, become incapable of caring for himself. 
When an employee has, by unforeseen accident to 
himself, while engaged in · the line of his duty, 
been rendered helpless, the dictates of humanity, 
duty, and fair dealing demand that the employer 
if cognizant of the injury furnish medical assist-
ance. Of course, this duty should rest upon the 
employer only in extraordinary cases, where im-
mediate medical or surgical assistance is impera-
tively required to save life or avoid further seri-
ous bodily injury. It is one which arises out of 
strict necessity and urgent exigency. The duty 
arises with the emergency, and with it expires." 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Summary Judg-
. 
ment of the District Court is correct as a matter of law 
and should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SAMUEL C. POWELL 
DERRAH B. VAN DYKE 
Attorneys for Defend.arnts and 
Respondents 
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